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Upadesa Sahasri by Adi Shankara -
Part 5
84. Disciple.-" If this is so, Sir, what is my fault when the mental
changes resembling sound etc. and resulting in reflection of knowledge
of My own nature, are produced in Me who am of the nature of changeless
and eternal Consciousness?"
85. Teacher.-" It is true that you are not to be blamed. Ignorance,
as I told you before, is the only fault."
86. Disciple.-" Sir, why are there the states of dream and waking (in
me) if I am absolutely changeless like one in deep sleep?"
87. The teacher said to him, "But you always experience them
(whenever they arise)."
88. Disciple.-" Yes, I experience them at intervals but not
continuously."
89. The teacher said, "They are then adventitious only and are not
your own nature. They would surely be continuous' if they were
self-existent like Pure consciousness which is your own nature.
Moreover, they are not your own nature inasmuch as they are
non-persistent like clothes and other things. For what is one's own
nature is never seen to cease to persist while one is persisting. But
waking and dream cease to persist while Pure Consciousness continues to
do so. Pure Consciousness, the Self, persists in deep sleep; and
whatever is non-persistent (at that time) is either destroyed or negated
inasmuch as adventitious things, never the properties of one's own
nature, are found to possess these characteristics; for example, the
destruction of money, clothes, etc. and the negation of things acquired
in dream or delusion, are seen.
90. Disciple.-" But, Sir, when this is so, Pure Consciousness Itself
has to be admitted to be adventitious like waking and dream. For it is
not known in deep sleep. Or, (it may be that I have adventitious
consciousness or) am non-conscious by nature."
91. Teacher.----" No. (What you say is not right ). Think over it. It
is not reasonable (to say so). You may look upon Pure Consciousness as
adventitious (if you are wise enough); but we cannot prove It to be so
by reasoning even in a hundred years, nor (can It be proved to be so)
even by a dull man. As the consciousness (that has for its adjuncts
mental modifications) is a combination, no one can disprove its
existence for the sake of another, its manyness, and its destructibility
by any reasoning whatever; for we have already said that whatsoever does
not exist for itself is not self-existent. As Pure Consciousness, the
Self is self-existent; no one can disprove Its independence of other
things inasmuch as It never ceases to exist."
92. Disciple.-" But I have shown an exception, namely I have no
consciousness in deep sleep."
93. Teacher.-" No, you contradict yourself" Disciple.-" How is it a
contradiction?" Teacher-" You contradict yourself by saying that you are
not conscious when, as a matter of fact, you are so."
Disciple.-" But, Sir, I was never conscious of consciousness or of
anything else in deep sleep."
Teacher.-" You are then conscious in deep sleep. For you deny the
existence of the objects of knowledge (in that state), but not that of
Knowledge. I have told you that what is your consciousness is nothing
but absolute Knowledge. The Consciousness owing to whose presence you
deny (the existence of things in deep sleep) by saying, 'I was conscious
of nothing' is the Knowledge, the Consciousness which is your Self. As
it never ceases to exist, Its eternal immutability is self-evident and
does not depend on any evidence; for an object of Knowledge different
from the self-evident Knower depends on an evidence in order to be
known. Other than the object, the eternal Knowledge that is
indispensable in proving non-conscious things different from Itself, is
immutable; for It is always of a self-evident nature. Just as iron,
water, etc., which are not of the nature of light and heat, depend for
them on the sun, fire, and other things other than themselves, but the
sun and fire, themselves always of the nature of light and heat, do not
depend for them on anything else; so being of the nature of pure
Knowledge, It does not depend on any evidence to prove that It exists or
that it is the Knower."
94. Disciple.-" But it is transitory knowledge only that is the
result of a proof and not eternal Knowledge."
95. Teacher.-" No, These cannot reasonably be a distinction of
perpetuity or otherwise in knowledge. For it is not known that
transitory knowledge is the result of a proof and not, eternal
Knowledge, as Know1edge itself is such a result,"
96. Disciple.-"But eternal Knowledge does not depend on a knower
while transitory knowledge does so as it is produced by an intervening
effort. This is the difference,"
97. Teacher.-" The Knower which is the Self is then self-evident as
It does not depend on any evidence (in order to be proved)."
98. Disciple.-" (If the knowledge of the Self be independent of an
evidence on the ground that It is eternal) why should the absence of the
result of an evidence with regard to the Se!f be not so on the same
ground?"
Teacher.-" No, it has been refuted on the ground that it is pure
Knowledge that is it the Self."
99. "To whom will the desire (to know a thing) belong if the Knower
depends on an evidence in order to be known? It is admitted that one who
is desirous of knowing a thing is the Knower. His desire of knowing a
thing has for its object the thing to be known and not the Knower. For
in the latter case, there arises a regressus ad infinitum with regard to
the Knower and also with regard to the desire to know the Knower
inasmuch as the knower of the knower and so on (are to be known); and
such is the case with regard to the desires of knowing the knower.
Moreover, there being nothing intervening, the Knower, the Self, cannot
fall into the category of the known. For a thing to be known becomes
known when it is distanced from the knower by the birth of an
intervening desire, memory, effort or an evidence on the part of the
knower. There cannot be the knowledge of an object in any other way.
Again it cannot be imagined that the knower himself is distanced from
himself by anyone of his own desires etc. For memory has for its object
the thing to be remembered and not one who remembers it; so has desire
for its object the thing to be desired and not one who desires it. There
arises, as before, an inevitable regressus ad infinitum if memory and
desire have their own agents for their objects.
Adi Shankara
Upadesa Sahasri
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